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This paper examines the duration of fiscal consolidations among the fifteen EU 
Members States using data from the European Commission for the period 1960-2000. 
Using the duration model approach, we estimate the hazard and survivor functions of 
our series. Then we discuss what is the duration model that best fits our data, and which 
are the explanatory variables that best explain the probability of ending a fiscal 
consolidation period. We also deal with those aspects related to sample heterogeneity 
and the sensitivity of the results to different possible definitions of fiscal adjustment. 
We find evidence that the probability of ending a period of fiscal consolidation depends 
on the debt level, the magnitude of the adjustment, the extent of expenditure cuts, and 
the degree of cabinet fragmentation. We also find that under a stricter definition of fiscal 
consolidation, political  variables, such as coalition size and election year, gain 
importance with respect to economic variables as predictors of the probability of ending 
a fiscal consolidation period. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Between 1992 and 1998, the fulfillment of the Maastricht convergence criteria 
depended mainly on the ability of the European Members States to reduce their public 
deficits below the 3%GDP target. From 1999 on, to remain inside the limits imposed by 
the Stability and Growth Pact depends on the continuation of the fiscal consolidation 
that these countries started some years ago. 
 
The integration into the European Monetary Union originated a wave of fiscal 
adjustments around Europe. This called the attention of some prominent scholars who 
started to study aspects such as the type of fiscal adjustments, the quality of these 
adjustments and the determinants of successful consolidations. For example, according 
to McDermott and Wescott (1996) and Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1998), 
Buti and Sapir (1998) and Von Hagen, Hallett and Strauch (2001), fiscal adjustments 
that rely primarily on spending cuts in transfers and in the government wage bill can be 
expansionary (anti-keynesian effect) and have a better chance of success than do fiscal 
adjustments that rely primarily on tax increases and cuts in public investment (which 
tend not to last and are contractionary).  With respect to the best moment to introduce a 
consolidation and the speed of the adjustment, it has been affirmed that fiscal 
consolidations are usually started in periods of positive economic growth (Von Hagen, 
Hallett and Strauch, 2001), and that fast tax- reforms accompanied by deep labour 
market reforms increase the chances of success of the fiscal adjustment (Lindbeck, 
1994). 
 
In the field of Political Economy, some other authors combined those previous 
findings and tried to disentangle the political and institutional determinants that explain 
why some countries pursued some types of adjustment and not others, and what were 
the electoral consequences of these processes of fiscal consolidation
1. With respect to 
the first question, Perotti and Kontopoulus (1998) and Mulas-Granados (2002), find that 
the composition of the budget during periods of fiscal consolidation is affected by the 
fragmentation of the cabinet, and the ideology of the party in government. On the 
electoral aspects of fiscal policy, Halleberg and Von Hagen (1997) have studied the 
                                                 
1 For a literature review on the political economy of budget deficits, see Alesina and Perotti (1995), and 
Persson and Tabellini (1999).   3 
effects of electoral systems on fiscal outcomes, and Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1997) 
have shown that large consolidations, and those mostly based on public wages and 
transfers, are not conducive to electoral defeat or a change in the government more 
frequently than average.  
 
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that in the previous literature the success of 
fiscal consolidations has been defined in terms of duration
2, nobody has yet analysed the 
duration of fiscal consolidations in the European Union using the duration model 
approach. It remains to be investigated what explains that some consolidation 
experiences last longer than others. It also has to be answered what are the main 
economic and institutional variables that affect the probability of ending a fiscal 
consolidation sooner or later. This study comes precisely to fill this gap. 
 
In this paper we analyse the time spells between two consecutive years of fiscal 
expansion, or in other words, what are the number of years between the beginning and 
the end of a fiscal consolidation. We do this using the methodology of duration models 
that we have applied to data for the 15 EU Member States between 1960-2000. 
 
The article proceeds as follows. In section 2, we explain our criteria to select 
episodes of fiscal consolidation and we present our data. In section 3, we briefly 
describe the main aspects of duration models. In section 4 we present the empirical 
results that we have obtained. This section is divided into three parts: one that studies 
the hazard and the survivor functions in a non-parametric analysis; another one that 
studies the determinants of the probability of ending a fiscal consolidation; and final 
section that replicates the previous parametric analysis taking into account the period 
and group heterogeneity of our sample. Finally, in section 5 we develop a sensitivity 
analysis of our results to an alternative definition of fiscal consolidation. The final 
considerations in section 6 recapitulate the main findings of this article. 
 
                                                 
2 “A consolidation is deemed successful, if, two years after the initial adjustment, the government budget 
balance is at least 75 percent of the balance in the first year of the consolidation episode. A consolidation 
is called unsuccessful, if this condition is not met” (Von Hagen, Hallett and Strauch, 2001: 6). Alesina 
and Perotti (1995,1996b) discuss the robustness of their results with regard to different definitions.    4 
2. Duration of Fiscal Consolidations in the EU 
 
  Public deficit in the EU has been above 3% of GDP since 1975 and reached its 
maximum in 1993 after the 1992-93 recession recording 6% of GDP. These persistent 
deficits led to rapidly increasing government debt, which jumped from 30% of GDP in 
the 1970s to a maximum of 72% in 1996, and still remains at 64% of GDP (with 
Belgium, Greece and Italy over 100%). Under such unsustainable path, the Maastricht 
convergence criteria forced a strong fiscal consolidation in the European Union, which 
achieved a deficit reduction of 5 percentage points between 1993 and 1999.
3 
   
  In this study we use annual data between 1960-2000 for the fifteen EU Members 
States: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  To 
define our dependent variable we use data on cyclically adjusted budget balances. This 
data expresses the budget balances (Total Public Revenues minus Total Public 
Expenditures) adjusted by the economic cycle
4, as a percentage of the Gross Domestic 
Product of each country. 
 
  Based on this data, we generate a dummy variable called “Failure”, which takes 
value zero when the annual variation of the cyclically adjusted budget balance is bigger 
than zero (years of fiscal consolidation), and is equal to one, when the annual variation 
is zero or lower than zero (years of fiscal expansion). Using the dates in which a failure 
event occurs, we build a new variable called “Duration”, that counts the intervening 
years between two consecutive failures, that is, the time span that the fiscal 
consolidation lasts.  In our sample, the minimum number of years that a consolidation 
lasts is one year, and the maximum is ten years.  
 
 
                                                 
3 See EC (2000) for further information about the process of public deficit reduction in the run to EMU. 
4 We use data from AMECO, the Macroeconomic Database of the European Commission. The 
Commission´s method to estimate the cyclically adjusted series involves three steps. In the first step, the 
output gap is computed as the difference between the actual output and an estimated output trend, 
applying the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. In the second step, the budget sensitivity to the output gap is 
computed. This allows to compute the cyclical component of the budget. Finally, the cyclically adjusted 
budget balance is obtained by deducting the cyclical component from the actual government budget 
balance. For further details, see EC (2000b). 
   5 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: Failure and duration     
  Failure      Duration     








Mean  0.479  0.493  0.458  2.055  1.959  2.194 
Std. Dev.  0.500  0.501  0.499  1.478  1.314  1.684 
Variance  0.250  0.251  0.249  2.185  1.725  2.837 
Skewness  0.085  0.027  0.170  1.844  1.533  1.921 
Kurtosis  1.007  1.001  1.029  6.952  4.950  7.077 
             
No. of failures  237  145  92       
Observations  495  294  201       
 
 
  In Table 1 we present the structure of our data on Failure and Duration. As can 
be seen, the total number of observations is 495. The average duration of fiscal 
consolidations is 2.06 years. The number of registered failures is 237, and the average 
probability of ending a fiscal consolidation is 48%. The sample can be divided into two 
groups: 
1) The group of Highly-indebted countries is integrated by those countries with 
an average Debt/GDP ratio above the EU-15 average ratio. These countries are: 
United Kingdom, Greece, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy and Belgium. Their average 
duration is 2.19 years and its probability of ending the consolidation is 46%. 
 
2) The group of Lowly-indebted countries is made of those countries with an 
average Debt/GDP ratio below the EU-15 average ratio.  These countries are: 
Luxembourg, Finland, France, Spain Germany, Austria, Denmark, Portugal and 
Sweden. In this group the average duration of fiscal consolidations is 1.96 years, 
and its probability of failure is 49%.  
 
 
In Table 2, seven periods can be identified, all with different average durations 
and probabilities of failure. It is very interesting to observe that from 1962 to 1981, the 
average duration of fiscal consolidations was around 1.6 years, and the average 
probability of ending the consolidation was well above 50%. Between 1982 and 1991, 
the average duration increased until it reached 1.9 years and the probability of failure 
decreased to remain at 50%. Finally, during the nineties, and especially from 1996 to 
2000, the average duration of fiscal consolidations reached 2 years with a probability of   6 
ending the consolidation of only 16%. This last result derives from the fact that at the 
end of 2000, which is the last year in our sample, twelve out of fifteen EU Member 
States were still under ongoing consolidation episodes
5. Most of those episodes were 
initially launched by the Maastricht convergence criteria, and are currently reinforced 
by the Stability and Growth Pact. Because these consolidations were still ongoing in 
2000, the probability of ending the consolidation for 1996-2000 is very low. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics: Failure and duration by periods   
Failure  Duration
Periods  Mean  Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Freq.
62/72  0.532  0.502 1.734 1.022 79
73/77  0.547  0.501 1.560 0.889 75
78/81  0.717  0.454 1.633 1.057 60
82/87  0.400  0.493 2.056 1.319 90
88/91  0.661  0.478 1.804 1.212 56
92/95  0.433  0.500 1.883 1.075 60
96/00  0.160  0.369 3.547 2.207 75
                 
All  0.479  0.500 2.048 1.450 495
 
Figure 1 below shows the duration of fiscal consolidations in the period 1960-
2000, where 46% of fiscal consolidations lasted one year, 21% two years, 13% three 
years, and 20% lasted four years or more. 
 








































                                                 
5 The three countries that just ended their consolidation episodes in 2000 are Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands.   7 
  As could be expected, the group of  Highly-indebted countries shows a flatter 
distribution than the Lowly-indebted one, because less number of its fiscal 
consolidations finished in the first four years, and many more of them lasted five or six 
years. 
 


















3. Duration Analysis 
 
In this section, we offer a description of the main concepts that best characterize 
duration models. These models have been mainly used in Labor Economics
6, to study 




In the field of Public Economics and Fiscal Adjustments, the duration of 
consolidation periods had been studied by different authors (mainly Alesina and Perotti, 
1995, and Alesina and Ardagna, 1998) in an indirect way. The approach consisted in a 
two-step analysis: first, a pre-selection of consolidation episodes according to a pre-
defined threshold; and second, a detailed account of the number of years contained in 
each episode and a description of the main characteristics attributable to them. This 
                                                 
6 Duration models have been also used in the field of Industrial Organization, to analyze for example the 
life duration of multinational subsidiaries in the UK manufacturing industry (Mc Cloughan and Stone, 
1998), or to analyze investment decisions (Licandro, Goicolea and Maroto, 1999). 
7 See Kiefer (1988) for a literature review. See also  Sosvilla-Rivero and Maroto (2001) for  a detailed 
study of the duration of exchange rates regimes  in the European Monetary System (EMS). This section 




















































































8  8 
approach allowed them to attribute certain characteristics as correlated to longer or 
shorter durations and more or less successful experiences. 
 
Until now, only Von Hagen, Hallett and Strauch (2001) have analyzed the 
duration of fiscal consolidations in the EU using a duration model, but only with data 
until 1998. Nevertheless, maybe because their study covers many more aspects of 
consolidations beyond the determinants of the duration of fiscal adjustments, the short 
section they dedicate to this analysis lacks a serious discussion of the most adequate 
duration model for this type of analysis, and omits some of the more important 
explanatory variables that determine the duration of consolidation episodes.  
 
Before we continue with the paper, it is useful to review the basic concepts and 
functions used in duration analysis. 
 
3.1. Non-parametric analysis 
 
  In the non-parametric or empirical analysis we use the information contained in 
the “Duration” variable. In our case, this variable counts the intervening years between 
two years of fiscal expansion, or in other words, between the beginning and the end of a 
fiscal consolidation. 
 
  Those econometric models developed to analyze this type of information are 
called duration models. If we define T as the discrete random variable that measures the 
time span between the beginning of a fiscal consolidation and its transition to a non-
consolidation period, the observations at our disposal consist of a series of data (t1, t2,… 
tn) which correspond to each of the observed durations of each consolidation episode in 
our sample. The probability distribution of the duration variable can be specified by the 
cumulative distribution function: 
 
        F(t)=Pr(T<t)           (1) 
 
which indicates the probability that the random variable T is smaller than a certain value 
t. 
   9 
 The corresponding probability function is then: 
 
        P(t)=Pr (T=t)           (2) 
 
  But in duration models two m ain functions are used to characterize the 
probability distribution of the duration variable: 
(a) The survivor function is defined as: 
 
S(t)=Pr(T￿t)=1-F(t)          (3) 
 
and it gives the probability that the duration of the fiscal consolidation is greater than or 
equal to t. 
(b) The hazard function is defined as: 
 
h(t)=Pr(T=t/ T￿t)          (4) 
 
and it gives, for each duration, the probability of ending a consolidation episode and 
starting a fiscal expansion, conditioned to the duration of the consolidation through that 
moment. 
  There exists a relation between both functions given by the following 
expression: 
 




= =- ￿          (5) 
 
  One of the advantages of the hazard function is that it allows us to characterize 
the dependence path of duration. Formally, there exists a positive duration dependence 
in  t* if  dh(t)/dt>0, in the moment  t=t*. This positive correlation implies that the 
probability that a fiscal consolidation ends in  t, given that it has reached t, depends 
positively on the length of this consolidation episodes. Thus, the longer the episode, the 
higher the conditional probability of entering into a fiscal expansion. Similarly, there 
exists negative duration dependence if dh(t)/dt<0 in t=t*. In this case, the longer the 
fiscal adjustment episode, the lower the conditional probability of starting a fiscal 
expansion.   10 
 
  The non-parametric analysis is used to estimate the unconditional hazard 
function which registers all the observations for which there is a change, that is, the 
relative frequency of observations with T=t. For this analysis of duration, the Kaplan-
Meier estimate is widely used (Kaplan and Meier, 1958). The hazard function is 
calculated as follows: 
 






=             (6) 
where dt represents the number of failures registered in moment t, and nt is the surviving 
population in moment t, before the change takes place. From the hazard function, it is 
possible to obtain the cumulative hazard function with an estimation procedure 
proposed by Nelson (1972) and Aalen (1978). This hazard function is then given by the 
following expression: 







=￿           (7) 
 
The Kaplan-Meier survivor function for duration t is calculated as the product of 
one minus the existing risk until period t: 
 











=￿         (8) 
3.2. Parametric analysis 
 
  The non-parametric analysis is very limited because it does not take into account 
other variables that can influence the probability of ending a period of fiscal 
consolidation. In order to address the issue of other variables determining this 
probability, we also include in this paper a section dedicated to parametric analysis. In 
the literature, the model that has usually been used to characterize the hazard function is 
the Model of Proportional Hazard (PH), which assumes that the hazard function can be 
split as follows: 
 
        0 (,)()*() htXhtgX =         (9)   11 
 
where ho(t) is the baseline hazard function that captures the dependency of data to 
duration,  and g(X) is a function of individual variables. This function of explanatory 
variables is a negative function usually defined as g(X)=exp(X´â). Note that in this 
proportional specification regressors intervene re-escalating the conditional probability 
of abandoning the period of fiscal consolidation, not its own duration. 
 
  This model can be estimated firstly without imposing any specific functional 
form to the baseline hazard function, following the Cox  Model (1972)
8: 
 
        0 (,)()*exp(´) htXhtX b =                 (10) 
 
  An alternative estimation can be done by imposing one specific parametric form 
to the function h0(t). In this case, the models most commonly used are the Weibull 
Model and the Exponential Model. In the first one, h0(t)=pt
p-1, where p is a parameter 
that has to be estimated. When  p=1, the Weibull Model is equal to the Exponential 
Model, where there exists no dependency on duration. On the other hand, when the 
parameter  p>1, there exists a positive dependency on duration, and a negative 
dependency when p<1. Therefore, by estimating p, it is possible to test the hypothesis 
of duration dependency of fiscal consolidations. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
  In this section we present the results obtained from the duration analysis of the 
different episodes of fiscal consolidation that have taken place between 1960 and 2000 
in the European Union. First, we present the results of the non-parametric analysis 
obtained after estimating the Kaplan-Meier survivor and hazard functions. And 
secondly, we present the results of the parametric analysis obtained after including 
explanatory variables in the duration models previously specified. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Mathematically, the baseline hazard function, h0(t), is defined for all time t in which a change has taken 
place, and it is not defined for other moments of time. But the survivor function S0(t) is defined for all 
values of t.    12 
4.1. Non-parametric estimation 
   
Table 3 below shows the number of failures and the surviving population 
registered at each moment t, and the Kaplan-Meier survivor function. For durations 
greater than eight, there are no failures because there are some consolidation episodes 
(those lasting longer than seven years) that had not yet finished in 2000.  
 
Table 3.List the Kaplan-Meier survivor function 
  Begin    Net  Survivor 
Duration  Total  Fail  Lost  Function 
         
1  485  132  111  0.728 
2  242  44  65  0.596 
3  133  32  32  0.452 
4  69  10  21  0.387 
5  38  10  11  0.285 
6  17  2  6  0.251 
7  9  1  4  0.224 
8  4  0  2  0.224 
9  2  0  1  0.224 
10  1  0  1  0.224 
 
Subsequently, we have censured our sample at five years, and we have created a 
new duration variable. The new duration variable has the same values than the original 
duration variable for durations shorter than five years, but groups under value five all 
longer durations. 
 
  Figure 3 shows the estimated survivor function for the fifteen EU Member States 
using the new duration variable. This function gives for each period the probability of 
maintaining the fiscal consolidation. As can observed, the probability of maintaining the 
consolidation decreases strongly (0.4) in short consolidations (those that last one and 
two years). For longer durations, the decrease in the probability of maintaining the fiscal 
consolidation is smoother. For the whole sample, the average probability of maintaining 
a certain consolidation is estimated to be 0.6. 
    13 
 
Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier survivor function. All countries 
 











Below, Figure 4 presents the estimated survivor functions for both groups of 
countries. The probabilities of continuing the fiscal consolidation after the first year and 
the second year drop dramatically in both groups of countries. As can be observed, the 
divergence between the groups increases after the second year. These results are 
influenced in the group of Lowly-indebted countries by such countries as Luxembourg 
and Finland, which combine very few periods of fiscal consolidation with very short 
durations when these few consolidations occur (average durations of 1.71 and 1.95 
years, respectively). On the opposite side, in the group of Highly-indebted countries, 
Italy and Belgium combine a considerable amount of consolidation experiences with an 
average duration of 2.37 and 2.26 years, respectively. Italy shows the largest average 
duration of fiscal consolidations, but this result is a combination of little number of 
consolidation episodes of medium length, and a single and very long consolidation 
effort of ten years in the nineties. 
  
   14 
Figure 4.Kaplan-Meier survivor functions by group 
 













Figure 5 presents the estimated survivor function by periods. It is very 
interesting to observe that in the period of strongest fiscal consolidation (1996-2000), 
when 11 countries entered in the third stage of EMU, the probability of maintaining the 
consolidation remained close to 85% almost independently of whether the consolidation 
started one, two, three or four years before. 
 
Figure 5.Kaplan-Meier survivor functions by periods 
 















Figure 6 shows the log-log plot for the Kaplan-Meier survivor function. As can 
be seen, this plot reveals linearity, suggesting that a monotonic hazard function could be 
appropriate for our data. 
   15 




























  The estimated hazard function in Figure 7 gives additional evidence of that 
interpretation, since its shape indicates positive duration dependence. The convexity of 
that function implies that the probability of ending a fiscal consolidation is an increasing 
function in t, conditional on duration. This means that the longer the period of fiscal 
consolidation accumulated until t, the higher the probability that the consolidation will 
end in moment t. That hazard rate is higher after one year of consolidation, after three 
years of consolidation, and much higher after five or more years of consolidation.  
 
Figure 7. Kaplan-Meier hazard function. All countries 
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In order to test whether there exists homogeneity or heterogeneity in our sample, 
and whether or not we can expect equal survivor functions, we perform the Cox 
regression-based test for equality of survival curves. According to the results shown in 
Table 4, we cannot reject that equality of survival curves exists. 
 
Table 4.Cox regression-based test for equality of survival curves 
  Events      Relative 
All Countries  Observed    Expected  Hazard 
Austria  19    16.68  1.171 
Belgium   17    20.66  0.834 
Denmark  13    14.63  0.905 
Finland  20    15.97  1.293 
France  16    13.86  1.177 
Germany  18    19.88  0.923 
Greece  21    15.91  1.361 
Ireland  14    13.04  1.098 
Italy  12    16.69  0.727 
Luxembourg  11    12.03  0.934 
Netherlands  15    13.6  1.132 
Portugal  18    18.81  0.978 
Spain  15    12.19  1.267 
Sweden  15    12.71  1.208 
UK  13    20.33  0.651 
         
Total  237    237  1 
         
LR chi2(14)      10.18   
Pr>chi2  0.75  
 
  Nevertheless, when we do the same test differentiating our sample by periods 
and groups of countries, we obtain very different results. Tables 5 and 6 contain the 
results of the Cox regression-based test for equality of survival curves by group and by 
period, respectively. As the p-values show, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
equality of groups, but we reject the hypothesis that equality of periods exists. Thus we 
can say that our sample shows temporal heterogeneity, but no spatial heterogeneity. 
 
Table 5.Cox regression-based test for equality of survival curves 
  Events    Relative 
Group  Observed  Expected  hazard 
Lowly-indebted  145  136.77  1.063 
Highly-indebted  92  100.23  0.929 
       
All  237  237  1 
 
LR chi2(1) 
   
1.19 
 
Pr>chi2    0.27   
   17 
 
Table 6.Cox regression-based test for equality of survival 
curves 
  Events   Relative
Periods  Observed Expected Hazard
62/72  42 33.11 1.67
73/77  41 28.94 1.90
78/81  43 24.03 2.35
82/87  36 43.58 1.04
88/91  37 24.49 1.93
92/95  26 27.05 1.24
96/00  12 55.8 0.24
       
All  237 237 1
 
LR chi2(6)     83.3 
Pr>chi2    0.00  
 
  Again, the last period is very interesting, because it has a very low relative 
hazard rate. This indicates that in the second half of the nineties almost all EU countries 
entered a period of fiscal consolidation, but in most cases these consolidations had not 
yet finished in the last year of our sample. Because these consolidations were still 
ongoing in 2000, the relative hazard rate for 1996-2000 is very low. 
 
4.2. Parametric estimation 
   
In this section we analyze the factors that explain the probability of ending fiscal 
consolidations. On the one hand, we include a set of economic variables that are 
expected to be related to different lengths of fiscal consolidation, and on the other, we 
include a set of political variables that we think are important to explain the non-
economic determinants of these consolidations. 
 
  We have included the following variables:  
 
  1) Debt/GDP ratio: this is a continuous variable that measures the public debt 
with respect to Gross Domestic Product  for each country. Given that our dependent 
variable has been built based on cyclically adjusted budget balances that include interest 
payments generated by the pending debt, we expect that higher Debt/GDP ratios will be   18 
associated with longer episodes of fiscal consolidation, and thus associated with lower 
probabilities of ending the consolidation.
9 
   
2) Strength of consolidation: this continuous variable is the result in absolute 
terms of subtracting the annual variation of the cyclically adjusted budget balance to the 
chosen threshold that determines when a fiscal consolidation takes place. Remember 
that in our analysis the threshold is zero. This means that we consider any given year as 
a year of fiscal consolidation if the variation of the cyclically adjusted budget balance 
with respect to the previous year has been positive in any amount bigger than zero. In 
Section 5 of this article we will analyze the sensitivity of our results to a change in the 
threshold from 0% to 1%. 
 
3) Coalition size: this variable measures the number of political parties in 
government for each country and each year of our sample.
10 
 
4) Cabinet size: this variable measures the number of spending ministers in the 
cabinet
11 for each year and each country. The inclusion of both variables is related to the 
idea that fragmentation in decision-making is negative for expenditure control, because 
each group in a majority can push for an expenditure but it only internalizes a part of the 
costs and distortions of the associated increase in revenues needed to equilibrate the 
                                                 
9 The source of this variable as well as the rest economic variables or other variables based on economic 
data, is the AMECO Database of the European Commission. 
10 In the literature of fiscal adjustments there are many articles that prefer to use as a proxy for degree of 
decision-making fragmentation, an explanatory variable called “type of government” used for the first 
time by Roubini and Sachs (1989). We prefer however to use the simplest measure of all and the least 
subjective one, which is the number of parties in the government. We follow here Perotti and 
Kontopoulus (1998). Data on the number of parties in government until 1995 has been borrowed from 
Prof. Roberto Perotti, and we thank him especially for his generosity. His source is Woldendorp, Keman 
and Budge (1993) and The Europa World Yearbook for Greece, Portugal and Spain (the whole period), 
and all countries from 1995-2000. 
11 We have considered spending ministers to be the following: 1) Industry or Trade and/or ministers with 
related and/or subdivided competences like Foreign Trade, Commerce, and State Industries (if not 
attributed to Public Works-see next); 2) Public Works and/or Infrastructure and/or ministers with related 
and/or subdivided competences like (Public) Transportation, Energy, Post, Telecommunications, 
Merchant Marine, Civil Aviation, National Resources, Construction (if not specifically attributed to 
Housing-see below), Urban Development, etc; 3) Defense, 4)Justice; 5) Labor; 6) Education; 7) Health; 
8) Housing; 9) Agriculture. Also all ministers with economic portfolio are added to this group: 10) 
Finance and/or ministers with related and/or subdivided competences like First Lord of the Treasury, 
Budget, Taxation, etc.; 11) Economic Affairs and/or ministers with related and/or subdivided 
competences like (Regional) Economic Planning or Development, Small Businesses. As with the previous 
variable, we have borrowed this variable from Prof. Perotti until 1995 and have reproduced the rest of 
data until 2000 following the same criteria. The sources were again: Woldendorp, Keman and Budge 
(1993) and The Europa World Yearbook for Greece, Portugal and Spain (the whole period), and all 
countries from 1995-2000.   19 
budget (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson, 1981). Therefore, the larger the number of 
actors with a voice in the fiscal decision-making process, the stronger the pressure for 
more expenditures, and thus the larger the deviation from the optimal fiscal policy. This 
is why we expect that larger coalition governments and larger cabinets will be 
associated with shorter durations and higher probabilities of ending the fiscal 
consolidation. 
   
5) Number of failures: this variable simply measures the accumulated number of 
failures (ends of fiscal consolidations) that have taken place in each country before the 
current consolidation. We expect that the higher the accumulated number of failures, the 
less stable is the country in maintaining a tight fiscal policy. Under such circumstances 
it is more likely that the consolidation will end sooner.  
   
6) Quality of the adjustment: this variable measures the contribution of primary 
expenditures (current public expenditures minus interest payments) to the total deficit 
reduction achieved in each consolidation year. Let Contribution=(Xt-X0)/(St-S0), be the 
contribution of primary expenditures X to the adjustment in the surplus S, achieved 
between the first year of the consolidation episode 0, and the year under consideration 
t
12. Following all the literature on fiscal adjustments mentioned in the introduction, we 
expect that the higher the contribution of primary expenditures to the overall 
amelioration of the budget, the lower the probability that the consolidation will end, 
because we expect expenditure-based consolidations to last longer than revenue-based 
adjustments. 
   
7) Election year: this is a dummy variable, with value 1 when there was a 
general election in year t in country i, and it is zero when there is no election.
13 Because 
fiscal adjustments are unpopular, and politicians tend to spend more just before the 
election assuming fiscal illusion and misinformed voters
14, we expect election years to 
increase the probability of ending the consolidation 
 
                                                 
12 In this concrete definition of the variable we follow Von Hagen, Hallett and Strauch (2001: 10) 
13 Source: Armingeon., Beyeler, and Menegale (2000). 
14 See Buchanan and Wagner (1977) on fiscal illusion, and see Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1992)  on 
electoral business cycles.   20 
  We have estimated the functional forms discussed in section 3 by maximum 
likelihood, using 411 observations and 195 failures. Table 7 contains the parameter 
estimates for these alternative hazard function models. Recall that a positive parameter 
indicates an increase in the hazard rate, that is, an increase in the probability that the 
consolidation will end in period t+1, given that it lasted through period t. 
 
Table 7. Parametric estimation of proportional hazard model   
       
Duration  Cox  Exponential  Weibull 
       
Debt/GDP  -0.011**  -0.010**  -0.014** 
 (-5.29)  (-5.04)  (-5.70) 
Strength of adjustment  0.081  0.069  0.108* 
 (1.62)  (1.45)  (1.81) 
Coalition size  -0.016  -0.009  -0.036 
 (-0.38)  (-0.22)  (-0.71) 
Cabinet size  0.110**  0.101**  0.145** 
 (3.91)  (3.83)  (3.90) 
N. Failures  0.015**  0.012**  0.031** 
 (8.67)  (9.53)  (13.25) 
Quality of adjustment  -0.043**  -0.042**  -0.048** 
 (-4.63)  (-4.94)  (-4.17) 
Election year  0.151  0.160  0.179 
 (-1.24)  (1.40)  (1.16) 
Constant   -2.580**  -4.957** 
   (-8.46)  (-10.99) 
       
p     2.692** 
     (19.95) 
       
AIC  2074.31  719.31  524.45 
Wald chi2(7)  153.13  172.48  261.4 
No. of failures  195     
Number of obs  411     
Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. 
Robust variance-covariance matrix used. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% 
 
  As we can see in the table above, the three alternative specifications give almost 
identical results. All explanatory variables are significant and show the expected signs: 
the higher the Debt/GDP ratio and the higher the contribution of primary expenditures 
to deficit reduction, the less probable it is that the consolidation ends; the stronger the 
adjustment, the higher the number of spending ministers in the cabinet, the higher the 
number of accumulated failures, and during election years, the higher the probability 
that the fiscal consolidation ends and a fiscal expansion starts. The only unexpected sign 
comes from the variable Coalition size, because the three estimations predict more   21 
fragmented coalitions associated with lower probabilities of ending the consolidation. 
This result is probably very much influenced by cases of very institutionalized coalition 
governments that have decisively reduced public deficits with the strength of single 
party governments. These are specially the cases of Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark 
and Italy, all with coalition governments of three to five parties, that launched several 
fiscal consolidations since the mid eighties. 
 
  Nevertheless, the only explanatory variables that are statistically significant are 
Debt/GDP ratio, the Strength of the adjustment (only in the Weibull estimation), 
Cabinet size, the Number of failures, and the Quality of the adjustment. The p parameter 
in the Weibull estimation is statistically significant, positive and bigger than one, which 
means that the hazard function grows with time, and this is consistent with the empirical 
hazard function previously commented in the non-parametric analysis (see Figure 6). 
Therefore, we find significant positive duration dependence. 
 
  To select the best parametric model, there are different possibilities. When 
parametric models are nested, the likelihood-ratios or the Wald tests can be used to 
discriminate between them. This can certainly be done in the case of Weibull versus 
exponential. When models are not nested, however, these test are unsuitable and the 
task of discriminating between models becomes difficult. A common approach to this 
problem is to use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Akaike (1974) proposed 
penalizing each log likelihood to reflect the number of parameters being estimated in a 
particular model and then comparing them. For this purpose, the AIC can be defined as: 
 
      AIC=-2*(log likelihood)+2(c+q+1)               (17) 
 
where c is the number of model covariates (explanatory variables) and q is the number 
of model-specific auxiliary parameters. Although the best-fitting model is the one with 
the largest log likelihood, the preferred model is the one with the smallest AIC value. 
As we can see in Table 5, according to the AIC criteria, the Weibull estimation is the 
parametric model that best fits our data. In Table 5, we can also see the Wald test 
statistics, normally used for computation of the significance level of the estimate 
parameters. These tests confirm the superiority of the Weibull estimation. 
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  Finally, there exists an additional method to test the power of each model, 
through graphic analysis of the Cox-Snell residuals (1968). These residuals are defined 
as follows: 
      ê= - log S(t/x)                     (18)      
 
where S(t/x) is the estimated probability of surviving to time t. If the fitted model is 
correct, these residuals, which are always positive, should have a standard censored 
exponential distribution with hazard ratio 1. We can verify the model’s fit by 
calculating, based for example on the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates or the Aalen-
Nelson estimator, an empirical estimate of the cumulative hazard function, using the 
Cox-Snell residuals (cs) as the time variable. If the model fits the data, then the plot of 
the cumulative hazard versus cs should be a straight line with slope equal to unity and 
beginning at the origin. 
 
As can be observed in Figure 9, the Weibull plot clearly satisfies the exponential 
requirement for most of the time, except for larger residuals, where the slope appears to 
exceed the unity. This confirms that the Weibull model should be our preferred model. 
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4.3. Heterogeneity 
 
In the non-parametric analysis we showed that there was only temporal 
heterogeneity in our sample, and no spatial heterogeneity. In this section we repeat the 
parametric analysis of the previous section, but now we include dummy variables to 
control for the mentioned temporal heterogeneity
15. 
 
Table 8. Parametric estimation of proportional hazard model with heterogeneity 
Duration  Cox  Weibull 
     
Debt/GDP  -0.006**  -0.006** 
 (-2.37)  (-2.1) 
Strength of adjustment  0.078*  0.109* 
 (1.65)  (1.86) 
Coalition size  0.016  -0.011 
 (0.36)  (-0.19) 
Cabinet size  0.050*  0.073* 
 (1.68)  (1.77) 
N. Failures  0.013**  0.030** 
 (7.8)  (12.42) 
Quality of adjustment  -0.038**  -0.038** 
 (-3.89)  (-2.8) 
Election year  0.090  0.096 
 (0.75)  (0.61) 
1962-1972  1.927**  2.253** 
 (5.01)  (5.22) 
1973-77  1.579**  1.977** 
 (4.25)  (4.7) 
1978-81  1.893**  2.247** 
 (5.27)  (5.61) 
1982-87  1.267**  1.474** 
 (3.75)  (4.07) 
1988-91  1.745**  1.947** 
 (5.21)  (5.18) 
1992-95  1.424**  1.697** 
 (4.19)  (4.7) 
Constant    -6.292** 
   (-11) 
p    2.844** 
   (20.46) 
     
AIC  2023.09  459.55 
Wald chi2(13)  205.92  319.53 
No. of failures  195   
Number of obs  411   
Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. 
Robust variance-covariance matrix used. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% 
                                                 
15 We include dummy variables for all periods except the final one.   
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Results in Table 8 confirm our previous findings. After controlling for periods, 
where all control variables were statistically significant, the only explanatory variable 
that has lost statistical significance is the Cabinet Size, while Debt/GDP,  Number of 
failures and Quality of adjustment, remain as strong predictors of  the probability of 
ending the fiscal consolidations. 
   
Again, the AIC statistics show that the Weibull estimation is the best model for 
our data. The analysis of the Cox-Snell residuals below confirms this statement. 
 















5. Sensitivity analysis 
 
  In this last section we replicate the parametric analysis of section 4.1, but now 
we change the definition of fiscal consolidation. Now we consider that a fiscal 
consolidation takes place in a given year if the cyclically adjusted budget balance with 
respect to GDP in that year increased by 1% or more from the previous year. By 
changing the threshold from 0% to 1% we want to test the sensitivity of our results to 
different definitions of fiscal adjustment. We can say that the 0% threshold is the 
minimum threshold that one can impose to differentiate fiscal consolidation years from 
fiscal expansion ones. The 1% threshold is the most common in the literature on fiscal 
adjustments
16, because it discriminates in favor of strong consolidation experiences, 
                                                 
16 In the literature (for example, Alesina and Perotti, 1995, and Perotti 1998; and Von Hagen, Hallett and 
Strauch, 2001), fiscal consolidations are defined as periods in which the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance (current revenues minus current expenditures, excluding interest payments) increased by at least 
1.25% of cyclically adjusted GDP two consecutive years, or when it increased by 1.5% or more in one 
year and was positive but less that 1.25% the previous or the subsequent year. Because we are doing 
Cox
Cox-Snell residual
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where the political commitment to reduce the public deficit is strong and cannot be 
attributed to unintended outcomes. 
As we can see in Table 9, the number of failures under the Stronger definition 
(the 1% threshold) is bigger than under the  Weaker definition (390 versus 237). 
Furthermore, under the Stronger definition, the average probability of ending the fiscal 
consolidation is much higher than under the previous definition (77.8% versus 47.6%), 
and the average duration is much lower (1.29 years versus 2.05). The maximum 
duration under this new threshold is four years.  
 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics: Failure and duration by threshold   
  Failure    Duration   
  Weaker  Stronger  Weaker  Stronger 
Mean  0.476  0.778  2.048  1.295 
Std. Dev.  0.500  0.416  1.450  0.623 
Variance  0.250  0.173  2.103  0.389 
Skewness  0.095  -1.341  1.690  2.322 
Kurtosis  1.009  2.798  5.787  8.343 
         






   
 
In Figure 11 we show the Kaplan-Meier survivor and hazard estimates for both 
thresholds. As we can see, the probability of maintaining the consolidation after the first 
year decreases even more under the new definition (0.6 versus 0.4) than what it did 
under the initial definition. These differences are maintained for longer durations, 
because the probability of maintaining the consolidation after the second year decreases 
0.2 under the new definition, when it only decreased about 0.1 under the initial 
definition. This behavior is translated into a smoother estimated hazard function, that 
clearly shows higher positive dependency on accumulated duration under the Stronger 
definition than under the Weaker one. 
 





                                                                                                                                               
duration analysis we cannot impose to our definition any time restriction, as they do. Therefore the 
threshold that we should have applied is the amelioration of the cyclically adjusted primary balance by 
1.25%. But because we want to use cyclically adjusted data that includes interest payments in order to 
include the Debt/GDP ratio as an explanatory variable, we decided to take as “the literature’s threshold” 
the amelioration of the cyclically adjusted budget balance (including interest payments) by 1% or more.    
analysis time
 Stronger  Weaker







 Stronger  Weaker
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Finally, we estimate the same model that we estimated with the initial threshold, 
but now under the new definition of fiscal consolidation. We expect the coefficients of 
all explanatory variables to maintain their signs and their statistical significance. 
 
In Table 10 below, we present a comparison of the Weibull estimations under 
the  Weaker (threshold 0%) and the  Stronger (threshold 1%) definitions of fiscal 
consolidation. 
 
Table 10. Parametric Weibull estimation by threshold 
     
Duration  Weaker  Stronger 
     
Debt/GDP  -0.014**  -0.012** 
 (-5.70)  (-4.96) 
Strength of adjustment  0.108*  0.104** 
 (1.81)  (2.15) 
Coalition size  -0.036  0.122** 
 (-0.71)  (2.62) 
Cabinet size  0.145**  0.071** 
 (3.90)  (2.29) 
N. Failures  0.031**  0.011** 
 (13.25)  (15.99) 
Quality of adjustment  -0.048**  -0.019 
 (-4.17)  (-1.15) 
Election year  0.179  0.207* 
 (1.16)  (1.67) 
Constant  -4.957**  -3.490** 
 (-10.99)  (-9.63) 
     
p  2.692**  3.548** 
 (15.65)  (24.50) 
     
AIC  524.45  347.96 
Wald chi2(7)  261.4  356.62 
No. of failures  195  316 
Number of obs  411  414 
Absolute z-statistics in parentheses 
Robust variance-covariance matrix used. 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%  
 
   
  As can be observed by looking at the results above, the effect of the Debt/GDP 
ratio, the Strength of adjustment, the Size of the cabinet and Number of failures is the 
same under both definitions: the larger the level of Debt, the less likely is that the 
consolidation ends; and the larger the Strength of adjustment, the Cabinet and the 
Number of accumulated failures, the more probable is that the consolidation finishes. 
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Nevertheless, under the stronger definition, the Quality of the adjustment stops 
being statistically significant . While the two political variables, such as Coalition size 
and Election year, suddenly gain statistical significance (Coalition now shows the 
expected sign). Under the stricter new definition, larger coalitions, larger cabinets, and 
election years increase the probability of ending a fiscal consolidation. Or in other 
words, under stricter definitions of fiscal consolidation, economic explanatory variables 
loose predictive power in favor of political variables. These results indicate that stronger 
fiscal adjustments are the result of strong and very committed governments not 
threatened by the fear of loosing next elections, willing to pursue unpopular policies 
with the objective of improving the government’s budget balance. 
 
6. Final Remarks 
 
In this article we have examined the duration of fiscal consolidations in the 
European Union. To do this we have applied the methodology of duration models to 
annual data on cyclically adjusted budget balances for the 15 EU Member States 
between 1960 and 2000. We have studied the time spells between two fiscal expansions, 
or in other words, the number of years between the beginning and the end of fiscal 
consolidation episodes, calculating the hazard and the survivor functions for those 
consolidations. 
 
First, we have done a non-parametric analysis where we have only taken into 
account time, in order to assess the impact of duration on the probability of maintaining 
a fiscal consolidation. Results suggest that this probability decreases rapidly after the 
first year and decreases less dramatically for longer durations. Also we have estimated 
the empirical hazard function, and the results showed a positive slope from the third 
year on. We distinguished two groups of countries (Highly-indebted countries, when 
their average debt ratio was above the sample mean, and  Lowly-indebted countries 
otherwise), and seven periods of fiscal adjustment. After performing a test for equality 
of survivor functions, we rejected that equality between countries and groups existed 
and we assumed period heterogeneity in our sample. 
 
Second, we have performed a parametric analysis, in order to control for more 
variables that could influence the probability of ending fiscal consolidations. We have   28 
found that the level of Debt, the Fragmentation of the cabinet (measured by the number 
of spending ministers), the Strength of the adjustment, and the quality of the adjustment 
(measured by the contribution of primary expenditures to the total amelioration of the 
budget balance), helped to explain the probability of ending the fiscal consolidations. 
After repeating the calculations including some dummy variables to control for the 
mentioned heterogeneity, previous findings remained unaltered. 
 
Finally, we have performed a sensitivity analysis, changing our initial definition 
of fiscal consolidation and repeating the parametric analysis under the new definition. 
After comparing the results obtained under the Weaker and the Stronger definitions, we 
have found that under the Stronger definition, political variables gained importance with 
respect to economic variables as predictors of probability of ending the fiscal 
consolidations. 
 
We consider this study the first attempt to analyze systematically the 
determinants of duration of fiscal consolidations episodes in the European Union. Our 
results are very relevant to better understand the determinants of longer or shorter 
experiences of fiscal adjustment. For example, the current process of pro-cyclical fiscal 
policies recently denounced by the European Commission
17, and the subsequent ending 
of most of the fiscal consolidation episodes originally launched in the mid 1990s to 
qualify for the third stage of EMU, can be more easily interpreted from the new 
perspective that our results provide. It certainly seems that once every country has 
qualified for the third stage of EMU, the combined effect of accumulated duration, 
economic slowdown, forthcoming elections
18 and relaxed political commitment towards 
adjustment, is definitively at the core of the current difficulties that the Stability and 
Growth Pact is currently facing. 
                                                 
17 See EC (2001). 
18 Between 2000 and 2001 parliamentary and/or presidential elections took place in eight out of the fifteen 
EU Member States (Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom). In line 
with their electoral discourses, the red and green government coalition that resulted from the 2002 
German elections, was the first one in Europe to question  the future of the Stability and Growth Pact.   29 
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